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Massive dollars shuttled back and forth 
among firms on the twisted path to and passage 
of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA).1
Prices of individual stocks responded as expec-
tations got revised. The path started with a jolt: 
Donald Trump’s surprise election. The immedi-
ate relative stock price response confirmed the 
widespread view that corporate taxes would go 
lower, and that trade practices would be more 
restrictive. Nothing draconian was done with 
trade arrangements in 2017. Similarly, little was 
determined on the fate and form of any tax leg-
islation through the first ten months of 2017. In 
the last two months, Congress got busy, and the 
TCJA became law on December 22, 2017.
This paper investigates two questions. First, 
how did individual stock prices move in those 
last two months as the prospects for tax reform 
waned and waxed, and its contents shifted? 
Second, to what extent was the (anticipated and
actually implemented) tax reform responsible
for the steep increase in the stock market from 
the election through the end of 2017?
1 The legislation was passed under the name “Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act” by the House, but had to be renamed “An 
Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and 
V of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal 
year 2018” to comply with Senate rules. We shall 
nevertheless refer to it as the TCJA throughout the paper for 
convenience.
It is important to note that major uncertainties 
persisted until the end: Would a bill pass? Which 
corporate tax rate would apply? When would tax 
cuts go into effect? What tax rate would apply 
to unremitted foreign earnings? Would there be 
territorial or worldwide taxation of corporate 
profits? The final answers were yes to passage, 
a 2018 initiation date for a 21 percent federal 
corporate tax rate, a tax of 15.5 percent on pre-
viously untaxed foreign earnings held in cash, 
and territorial taxation. The analysis particularly 
attends to individual stock movements imme-
diately after  game-changing events such as 
the introduction of the tax bill in the House on 
November 2 and the Senate passage of a revised 
bill on December 2.
From the bill’s release from the House Ways 
and Means Committee on November 2 until 
final passage,  high-tax firms gained signifi-
cantly, given the dramatic cut in the corporate 
tax rate.  Internationally oriented firms suffered 
notably, presumably because investors assessed 
that the surprisingly high repatriation tax (which
increased repeatedly through the process) out-
weighed the benefits from territorial taxation.
We examine the relationship between tax 
cuts and overall market moves. From Trump’s 
election until the TCJA’s passage, on those days 
when  high-tax firms outperformed (underper-
formed)  low-tax firms the market tended to
move upward (downward). The effect is sizable:
A one standard deviation greater sensitivity of 
stock returns to taxes on a given day was asso-
ciated with a 0.15 percentage points (or 33 per-
cent of a standard deviation) increase in market
returns.
I. The Path to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
Corporate taxes and trade were key ele-
ments of Donald Trump’s electoral bid. Thus, 
it is hardly surprising that after the election, 
expectations of lower corporate taxes and more 
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 restrictive trade policies were priced in strongly 
by the stock market. Investigating the stock mar-
ket response to the election through the first hun-
dred days of the Trump Administration, Wagner, 
Zeckhauser, and Ziegler (forthcoming)—hence-
forth, WZZ—show that  high-tax firms and those 
with large deferred tax liabilities gained; those 
with significant deferred tax assets from net 
operating loss carryforwards lost. Domestically 
focused companies fared better than internation-
ally oriented firms.
While the market did an impressive job pric-
ing in the news of the election, the adjustment to 
the new world was not easy:  Single-firm stock 
returns exhibited extraordinary momentum 
for three days in a row after the election, then 
modestly reversed, before settling at their new 
equilibrium (Wagner, Zeckhauser, and Ziegler 
2018). Homing in on the new equilibrium took 
several days as the market needed to digest the 
enormous and  multi-faceted surprise outcome of 
the election. Incomplete information processing 
regarding  tax-related aspects was an important 
source of momentum.
The significant  post-election stock price reac-
tion was overwhelmingly driven by changes in 
expectations about policies, not policy changes 
themselves. By the  100-day mark no legis-
lation had been initiated or even sketched on 
either tax policy or fundamental foreign trade 
matters. Substantial uncertainty about what 
would happen in the corporate tax domain per-
sisted  post-election for two reasons. First, the 
Republicans’ Senate majority was only two. 
Second, there were two Republican corporate 
tax plans going into the election—one from 
the Trump campaign, and one from the House 
Republicans. The two differed on a number of 
dimensions.2
2 The two plans agreed on three critical elements: dra-
matic reduction in the federal statutory rate from its level of 
35 percent, the expensing of capital expenditures with a lim-
itation on interest expense deductibility, and an announced 
intention to tax accumulated foreign earnings. The key differ-
ences between them were on the issues of border adjustment, 
territorial versus worldwide taxation, and  net-operating-loss 
rules (which the Trump plan did not address). Importantly, 
some aspects of both plans affect multinationals differently 
from purely domestic firms. Furthermore, while Trump’s 
plan did not include a border adjustment tax, he had repeat-
edly promoted introducing or increasing tariffs during the 
campaign, and hinted at other measures to protect American 
industry. 
For most of 2017, President Trump and 
Congress focused on healthcare issues. When 
legislative efforts in this area failed in late sum-
mer, the Congressional Republicans turned to 
tax reform. From then on, the tax reform moved 
through the legislative process by both chambers 
on December 20 and impressively swiftly, mak-
ing it ideal for an event study. The framework for 
the reform was released on September 27. The 
House Ways and Means Committee released a 
draft bill on November 2 and approved it with 
amendments on November 9; the House floor 
passed it on November 16. On the same day, 
the Senate Finance Committee approved its ver-
sion of the bill, which was passed in the Senate 
with amendments on December 2. The House 
and Senate Conference Committee reached an 
agreement on December 15. The final TCJA was 
adopted by both chambers on December 20 and 
signed into law on December 22.
The bill that ultimately passed contains new 
elements as well as elements from the origi-
nal Trump and House Republican plans. The 
three major provisions on which the Trump and 
House Republican plans agreed are included in 
the Act to varying degrees. Specifically, the cor-
porate income tax rate is reduced from 35 per-
cent to 21 percent (against targets of 15 percent 
in the Trump plan and 20 percent in the House 
Republican plan). Second, the Act provides for 
expensing of capital expenditures, increasing 
the  first-year “bonus” depreciation deduction to 
100 percent, and allowing corporations to imme-
diately write off the cost of acquisitions of plant 
and equipment. Third, it limits the deductibility 
of net business interest expense to 30 percent of 
adjusted taxable income.
The TCJA also makes fundamental changes 
to the taxation of multinational entities, shift-
ing from a system of worldwide taxation with 
deferral to a participation exemption regime 
with current taxation of certain foreign income. 
Specifically, the TCJA provides for a 100 per-
cent deduction for dividends received from 
10  percent-owned foreign corporations, but 
introduces a minimum tax on “global intangi-
ble  low-taxed income” (GILTI) and on certain 
deductible payments made to foreign affil-
iates (e.g., royalties and management fees, 
but excluding cost of goods sold). As a major 
feature in the transition to the new regime, the 
TCJA introduces a deemed repatriation of pre-
viously untaxed “old earnings” and taxes them 
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at much higher rates than envisioned earlier. 
Specifically, a 15.5 percent rate applies to past 
earnings held abroad attributable to liquid assets 
and an 8 percent rate to such earnings attribut-
able to illiquid assets (compared with targets of 
8.75 percent and 3.5 percent, respectively, in the 
House Republicans’ plan).
The TCJA comprises many other provisions, 
such as the indefinite carryforward of net oper-
ating losses, depreciating rather than expensing 
R&D, several elements relevant for  cross-border 
transactions, and an extended holding period for 
a carried interest to be treated as a  long-term 
capital gain. These factors merit a separate, 
detailed analysis outside the scope of this paper.
II. Corporate Taxes and the  Cross Section of 
Stock Returns
A. Data and Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy regresses abnormal 
returns (ARs) on “milestone days” during the 
period leading to the enactment of the TCJA (November 2 to December 22, 2017, henceforth 
the legislative period) on firm characteristics that 
proxy for aspects touched upon by the TCJA. It 
also examines cumulative returns on the same 
basis. Various provisions of the Act beyond the 
headline number of the corporate tax rate are 
likely to differentially affect stocks. We focus on 
four salient provisions, namely the deductibility 
of capital expenditures, caps on interest expense 
deductibility, the shift to territorial taxation, and 
the tax on accumulated foreign earnings.
The sample includes the Russell 3000 con-
stituents as of the day of the election.3 We 
exclude companies whose stock prices were 
below US$5 on September 30, 2017. We obtain 
stock prices adjusted for splits and net dividends 
from Bloomberg and compute  CAPM-adjusted 
returns as in WZZ.4 We obtain explanatory vari-
ables mostly from Compustat Capital IQ, and use 
the most current accounting data for all compa-
nies. This means the December 31, 2016 data for 
most companies, though not for several whose 
3 The Russell 3000 actually had 2,966 members as of 
November 8, 2016. A number of firms left the sample by 
November 2017 due to acquisition or bankruptcy. 
4 The size and value factor returns needed to compute 
 Fama-French adjusted returns are not available at the time 
of this writing. Returns are reported in percentage points. 
fiscal years end in another month. For many of 
the latter, calendar year 2017 data are included.5 
The cash effective tax rate (cash ETR) is com-
puted as the percent cash taxes paid (adjusted 
for special items) divided by current year pretax 
income.6 Capital expenditures are expressed in 
percent of assets. We construct a binary indica-
tor whether interest deductibility would be cur-
tailed for a company (detailed below). Market 
value of equity is from Bloomberg. The percent-
age of firm revenue from foreign sources also 
comes from Bloomberg, and is supplemented by 
Compustat geographical segment data. We trun-
cate the tax rates and capital expenditure ratios at 
the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. Descriptive 
statistics appear in online Appendix Table  A-1.
B. Results
Table 1 shows the results. For space reasons, 
we only report the explanatory variables meant 
to capture the effect of the main provisions of the 
TCJA, and not the control variables employed (market capitalization, revenue growth, profit-
ability, and industry fixed effects).
Consider first the coefficient on the cash ETR, 
which captures the differential impact of the 
reduction in the statutory rate on  high-tax and 
 low-tax firms. On the day the House Ways and 
Means Committee introduced a tax reform bill, 
 high-tax firms outperformed. The following two 
weeks saw relatively little systematic movement. 
Indeed the ultimate passage vote in the House 
on November 16 came with a slightly negative 
return for  high-tax firms. A Senate vote awaited, 
and whether a bill would pass there was highly 
uncertain given some recalcitrant Republicans 
and their razor thin majority. When the Senate 
did vote a bill, albeit one noticeably different 
from the House bill,  high-tax firms prospered. 
Column 7 shows that over the entire legisla-
tive period, the TCJA had a significant relative 
positive effect on  high-tax firms, as expected. 
Although the tax rate of 21 percent that was ulti-
mately adopted is substantially higher than the 
15 percent originally promised by Trump, the 
latter was not a possibility once legislators got 
5 Where Compustat data are missing for the most recent 
year, they are replaced with  prior-year data. 
6 The sample is restricted to those firms with both positive 
 pretax income and an effective tax rate below 100 percent. 
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busy, whereas no tax bill was a real possibility 
up until the Senate vote.
Early in the legislative period, reform pros-
pects hardly affected  internationally oriented 
firms. The House vote began a slide for multi-
nationals relative to  domestically focused com-
panies. This may seem surprising, as the shift to 
territorial taxation should, ceteris paribus, help 
multinationals. However, this ceteris lost its pari-
bus. The repatriation tax rate increased progres-
sively: while the original bill from House Ways 
and Means envisioned 12 percent for previ-
ously untaxed foreign earnings held in cash, the 
House adopted 14 percent, the Senate 14.49 per-
cent, and the Conference Agreement settled on 
15.5 percent. As expected, from the House vote 
until passage, stock of  internationally oriented 
companies were major relative losers.
The new capital expensing provision had little 
impact on the  cross section of stock returns for 
two reasons. First, existing bonus depreciation 
rules already allowed a 50 percent deduction in 
the first year, and full expensing was always in 
the air. Second, the marginal attractiveness of 
such expensing decreased given the dramatic cut 
in the statutory rate. An analysis not shown does 
reveal that from September 27, the date of the 
release of the framework for the reform, until the 
end of December,  high-capex firms benefited.
Finally, as expected, firms whose interest 
expense deductions would be curtailed under the 
TCJA reacted relatively negatively.7
Despite minor anomalies, predictions on how 
the TCJA would differentially impact firms are 
borne out by actual stock price movements. It 
is also noteworthy that the process was not 
monotonic: in between the major milestones, 
there were occasional overshoots and reversals. 
Winners on December 4 (after the Senate vote) 
lost some of their winnings on December 5 
7 Our analysis here uses the rule specified in the Senate 
version of the bill to determine whether a firm’s interest 
deductibility would be curtailed. Specifically, we define 
a binary indicator variable equal to one for firms where 
interest expense exceeds interest income plus 30 percent of 
EBIT. This limitation is applicable from 2022 onward under 
TCJA rules. Under the House version of the bill, EBITDA 
would have been relevant instead, and is applicable initially 
under TCJA rules. 
Table 1—The  Cross Section of Stock Price Reactions to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
Dependent variable:  CAPM-adjusted returns
Time period/event:
House bill 
introduced 
(Nov 2)
Nov 3 
through 
Nov 15
House vote 
passed 
(Nov 16)
Nov 17 
through 
Dec 1
Senate 
vote 
passed 
(Dec 4)
Dec 5 
through 
Dec 22
Introduction 
to signature 
(Nov 2 
through 
Dec 22)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cash effective tax rate (ETR) in percent 0.016 −0.015 −0.006 0.026 0.020 −0.009 0.039
  (0.006) (0.015) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.011) (0.019)
Percent revenue from foreign sources −0.004 0.004 −0.007 −0.038 −0.018 −0.003 −0.059
  (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011)
Capital expenditures in percent of −0.005 0.025 0.001 0.096 0.004 −0.001 0.143
 total assets (0.032) (0.065) (0.016) (0.086) (0.026) (0.070) (0.117)
Firm’s interest deductibility curtailed −0.433 0.389 −0.145 −1.449 −0.421 0.081 −2.288
  (0.204) (0.660) (0.162) (0.762) (0.224) (0.499) (0.887)
Observations 1,466 1,466 1,466 1,465 1,461 1,461 1,460
 R2 0.085 0.085 0.099 0.156 0.137 0.239 0.095
Constant and controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents OLS regressions of individual stock returns on the cash ETR, percent revenue from foreign sources, 
capital expenditures as a percent of total assets, a binary indicator that equals one if interest expenses of a firm exceed 30 per-
cent of EBIT plus interest income,  firm-level controls (size, revenue growth, and profitability), and  Fama-French  30-industry 
fixed effects. The time periods covered are indicated in the column headings. The sample includes Russell 3000 firms. Robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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(analysis not shown). The momentum and 
reversals were, however, weaker than those in 
the immediate aftermath of Trump’s election as 
documented in Wagner, Zeckhauser, and Ziegler (2018).
III. Corporate Taxes and the Aggregate Market
The preceding analysis focuses on individual 
companies, establishing the channels through 
which the TCJA influenced stock prices. But 
we must consider the forest, not merely the 
trees, and indeed the forest’s lifetime. The rise 
in the overall stock market is the most dramatic 
economic development since Trump’s election 
became known. From November 9, 2016 until 
the  end of 2017, the overall stock market, as 
represented by the Russell 3000 total return 
index, rose mightily. It was up by 5.82 percent 
to  year-end 2016, and a further 1.46 percent 
through Inauguration Day. By 100 days into the 
Trump Administration, the index had appreci-
ated by 13.08 percent from its  pre-election level. 
And by  the end of 2017, the index had risen 
28.18 percent from just before the election.
The fact that taxes were one of the key drivers 
of the  cross section of stock returns during the 
period from the election through Trump’s first 
100 days (see WZZ), and in the  run-up to and 
the passage of the actual tax cut (as documented 
above), raises a critical question: To what extent 
did changing expectations and the actual pas-
sage of tax reform drive ups and downs in the 
overall market?
A. Data and Empirical Strategy
To address this challenging question, we 
conduct a test inspired by the  Fama-MacBeth 
method. For each of the 287 trading days during 
the period from November 9, 2016 through the 
end of 2017, we run a  cross-sectional regression 
of excess stock returns on the cash ETR and 
control variables, including each stock’s expo-
sure to the market, size, and value factors.8 Note 
8 In this analysis, we use the most current accounting data 
for all companies applicable at the time of the election. For 
most companies, this means the December 31, 2015 data, 
with the exception of firms with fiscal years ending during 
2016. Each stock’s exposure to the market, size, and value 
factors is estimated using daily returns from October 1, 2015 
through September 30, 2016. 
that since market moves (and indeed moves in 
the size and value factors) might themselves 
be affected by taxes, we use raw excess returns 
rather than abnormal returns in this analysis. 
The daily coefficient on each variable reveals 
the size of the impact that a given stock char-
acteristic had on excess returns that day. In the 
extended model, we consider percent foreign 
revenues as well.
An  asset-pricing oriented interpretation of 
this approach is as follows: As is the case in the 
 Fama-MacBeth method, the coefficient on each 
variable on a given day represents the return on a 
 zero-cost ( long-short) portfolio with unit expo-
sure to the variable in question and no expo-
sure to the others. That is why it is important to 
include the market, size, and value factor expo-
sures as explanatory variables.9 Thus, for exam-
ple, the coefficient estimate on the cash ETR on 
a given day is the return on that day of a portfo-
lio that is long  high-tax firms and short  low-tax 
firms (with the difference in ETR between the 
long leg and the short leg equal to 1 percentage 
point) and has no exposure to market, value, 
size, etc.10 (The daily constant thus reflects the 
return of a portfolio that is not exposed to any of 
the variables, and accounts for return drivers not 
captured by our  cross-sectional model.)
In a second step, we run a  time-series regres-
sion of the daily excess returns on the Russell 
3000 total return index on the daily coefficients. 
The estimates from this regression tell us which 
factors were driving the market’s overall returns 
during the period.11
9 While it might at first sight seem odd to include both 
log market cap and the size factor exposure in the regres-
sion, both should be included because they measure different 
things. The size exposure measures how a given stock moves 
with the size factor, not the size of the firm as such—some 
small stocks might move like large stocks and conversely. 
For example, in our sample, AbbVie Inc. has a market cap-
italization of over $100 billion and a positive exposure of 
0.55 to the size factor. 
10 Obviously such a portfolio might involve significant 
leverage. However, since the explanatory variables remain 
constant through time, the underlying portfolio is identical 
every day; the only difference across days is the portfolio’s 
return. Hence, rescaling the portfolio would not affect the 
results of our analysis. 
11 The overall positive market development since the 
election is surprising given the strong positive relation 
between prediction market odds of Clinton winning and 
the returns on all major US equity index futures before the 
election (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2018). A positive short-
term aggregate market reaction to a surprise Republican 
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B. Results
Figure 1 summarizes the results. Details are 
given in online Appendix Table  A-2. There is 
a highly significant relationship between the 
daily coefficients on both the cash ETR and 
foreign revenues and overall market moves. In 
other words, the market tended to move upward (downward) on those days when  high-tax firms 
outperformed (underperformed)  low-tax firms. 
The effects are sizable: a one standard deviation 
greater sensitivity of stock returns to taxes on a 
given day is associated with 33 percent of a stan-
dard deviation increase in Russell 3000 returns.
A similar, albeit stronger, result applies for 
foreign revenues. The positive slope on for-
eign revenues shows that the market tended to 
go up on days where firms with large foreign 
exposure did better than their low foreign expo-
sure counterparts. (Interestingly, our analysis 
showed that on average  domestically oriented 
firms did better over the whole time period.) We 
note that these  aggregate-market effects might 
reflect linkages between the United States and 
the world economy and not merely tax or trade 
effects and therefore warrant further study.
These results cannot prove a causal impact of 
the prospect for or enactment of tax cuts on the 
market development between Trump’s election 
and  the end of 2017. It is conceivable that omit-
ted factors that drove variation in market returns 
were also correlated with the estimated coeffi-
cient on cash ETR in the daily regressions. But 
the findings strongly suggest that corporate taxes 
play an important role for aggregate stock mar-
ket valuations. They also suggest that American 
companies’ foreign exposure is important in the 
same way.
Presidency is in line with historical experience (Snowberg, 
Wolfers, and Zitzewitz 2007). Over the full term of admin-
istrations, large excess returns are realized under Democrat 
Presidents (Santa-Clara and Valkanov 2003). Blanchard et 
al. (2018) investigate potential explanations for the rise in 
the stock market since the election. To assess the role of tax 
cut expectations, they correlate weekly returns on the aggre-
gate market with changes in the price of a prediction market 
contract that pays out upon passage of a corporate tax cut in 
2017. This approach has the advantage that it directly uses 
the probability of a tax cut. However, the corresponding pre-
diction market contract is illiquid and its price only reflects 
the probability of a tax cut, not its  magnitude. By contrast, 
our method accounts for both the probability and the size 
of a cut. 
IV. Conclusion
From Donald Trump’s election to the actual 
passage of the TCJA, a bit more than a year 
later, stocks as a whole moved smartly upward. 
An anticipated major cut in corporate taxes, 
as our analysis shows, clearly played a major 
role. As in any boom period, some stocks did 
much better than others. What distinguishes this 
period’s boom was the clear and extensive role 
that expected and realized policy changes had 
for benefits and costs to firms. A dissection of 
individual stock price movements in the legis-
lative period showed  high-tax firms to be big 
beneficiaries, and firms with significant foreign 
exposures to have dragged behind. In sum, the 
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Figure 1. Taxes, Trade, and the Aggregate Market
Note: The figures show scatter plots of daily returns on the 
Russell 3000 total return index against coefficients on the 
cash ETR (top panel) and on percent foreign revenues (bot-
tom panel) from daily  cross-sectional regressions of raw 
stock returns on firm characteristics, controlling for all other 
variables shown in online Appendix Table  A-2, columns 2 
and 3.
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results confirm that taxes are a very important 
component of firm value.
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